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Abstract Large scale investments in European electricity
networks are foreseen in the next decade. Pricing the net-
work at marginal cost will not be sufficient to pay for those
investments as the network is a natural monopoly. This paper
derives numerically the socially optimal transmission prices
for cost recovery, taking into account that electricity net-
works are often congested, while allowing for market power
in generation. The model is illustrated with a Stackelberg
game for the Belgian electricity market.
Keywords Cost recovery · Energy networks · Market
power · Investments
Kostendeckung in überlasteten Stromnetzen
Zusammenfassung Hohe Investitionen in Europäische
Stromnetze sind in der nächsten Dekade zu erwarten. Ei-
ne Preisfestlegung für das Netz zu Grenzkosten wird für
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die Finanzierung dieser In-vestitionen nicht ausreichen, da
das Netz ein natürliches Monopol ist. Dieser Artikel leitet
numerisch die gesellschaftlich optimalen kostendeckenden
Übertragungspreise unter Berücksichtigung einer häufigen
Überlastung der Stromnetze unter gleichzeitiger Zulassung
der Marktmacht bei der Erzeugung ab. Das Modell wird mit-
tels eines Stackelberg-Spiels für den Belgischen Strommarkt
veranschaulicht.
1 Introduction
Significant investments in the high voltage network will be
necessary in the next decade. Two forces drive those in-
vestment needs: Cross-border transmission lines are essen-
tial to further integrate the European energy market as cur-
rent cross-border connections are chronically congested and
the integration of renewable energy sources in the network
will require significant network upgrades to deal with in-
termittency problems. The cost of those network upgrades
are significant and need to be recovered from network users.
The International Energy Agency (IEA 2006, p. 148) es-
timated the cost of electricity transmission investments to
be $159 billion for Europe. Given the stringent renewable
energy and CO2 targets, today’s estimates are likely to be
larger.
As electricity networks are natural monopolies, charging
consumers a price equal to their marginal impact on the net-
work will not suffice to cover the full network cost. Indeed,
there are large scale economies and providing network ser-
vices to one extra user will be cheaper than the average cost
for providing the existing users.
This paper derives how network users should be charged
for network usage, taking into account those economies of
scales and that (parts of) the network might be congested.
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Our paper takes a social planner’s viewpoint and focuses on
short run efficiency of network operation.
The main message of the paper is how cost recovery and
efficient network usage can be combined. Energy producers
and consumers pay an injection charge and a take-off charge
respectively. Efficient network usage requires that no addi-
tional transaction specific charges are imposed, i.e. once a
connection charge is paid, grid users can freely use the net-
work as long as the network is uncongested. For cost recov-
ery, consumers and generators should pay a network connec-
tion charge which is inversely proportional to the demand
and supply elasticity respectively, i.e. the charge should be
independent of how they use the network. Hence the pa-
per derives a generalization of the marginal nodal prices
(Schweppe et al. 1988).
We then extend the discussion to the case where gen-
eration firms have (local) market power. In that case the
network operator might want to “subsidize” those firms to
increase production and/or to reduce grid congestion. This
might improve overall welfare.1
The interaction of cost recovery, congestion management
and (local) market power are hard to disentangle in an an-
alytical model. Therefore, the model is illustrated numeri-
cally for the Belgian electricity market. We model a Stack-
elberg game in which in stage 1 the network operator sets
transmission charges and in stage 2 generators compete
while taking transmission charges as given. Three scenar-
ios are studied: a reference case in which we assume a net-
work operator without budget constraint (i.e. the cost recov-
ery issue is absent) and perfect competition in generation.
The second scenario adds a budget constraint, while the last
scenario drops the assumption of perfect competition and
assumes Cournot competition.
The next section reviews the literature on transmission
pricing and modeling market power in the energy markets.
Sections 3 and 4 describe the structure of the model and the
data. Section 5 discusses the simulation results and, finally,
Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
A large part of the literature on pricing electricity networks
has focused on ensuring the efficient usage of the network
but has neglected cost recovery.
2.1 Nodal Spot Prices
The seminal result of Schweppe et al. (1988) is that optimal
transmission prices should be zero if the network is not con-
gested. With congestion, transmission prices should be set
1In practice such payments might take the form of must-run contracts.
according to the peak load pricing rule (see also Hsu 1997).
Transmission prices should reflect the opportunity cost of
using the transmission line. These are the so-called conges-
tion charges or marginal nodal congestion charges.
Green (2004) compares the welfare effects of two other
pricing rules with this first best benchmark. He compares
a system of nodal prices, uniform prices and a hybrid, in
which generators face nodal prices but consumers face a
uniform price. He finds that moving from uniform prices to
optimal nodal prices could raise welfare by 1.5% of the gen-
erators’ revenues. Moreover, doing so would also provide
investment signals. Our approach differs from Green’s ap-
proach as we only use nodal prices, while considering the
impact of a budget constraint. A study similar to Green’s
was made by Bjorndal (2000), who compared the efficiency
of different types of zonal pricing schemes.
2.2 Cost Recovery
There is a lively debate on how network costs, in particu-
lar the cost of network upgrades, should be allocated to the
users of the grid. For instance, the integration of massive
amounts of renewable energy requires investments in under-
sea cables to connect wind farms, the procurement of addi-
tional reserve capacity, more flexible transformers etc. The
costs of such upgrades are not always allocated to the final
users. Knight et al. (2005) give an overview of the current
practices in several EU Member States. Most of these mech-
anisms allocate the cost of the existing network to all users
and allocate the (average or marginal) costs of upgrades to
the users of the extensions. Some proposed allocation meth-
ods suggest that firms should only pay for small network up-
grades that are directly related with their usage (for instance
the local transformer), while other methods define upgrade
costs in a very broad sense. Firms would then have to pay
‘deep connection charges’, that is, they would need to pay
for upgrade costs caused in the entire network.
Swider et al. (2008) argue that grid connection costs of
renewable energy should be socialized. A related discussion
is how network cost should be allocated between countries
when there are imports, exports and transit flows (Olmos Ca-
macho and Pérez-Arriaga 2007). One of the problems that
arise is that contractual obligations and transit flows do not
take into account the physical properties of the underlying
network. Non-contracted loop-flows, i.e. flows which are the
result of energy trades, do not only affect the importing and
exporting country, but affect third countries as well (Dax-
helet and Smeers 2005). In contrast with current practices in
Europe, our model acknowledges the physical properties of
the network, and fully takes into account loop flow.
The operation of the transmission network is a natural
monopoly, featured by decreasing average costs as transmis-
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sion output increases.2 Setting the price of network services
equal to the marginal cost would generate insufficient rev-
enue to cover costs. This is a well known problem in markets
with increasing returns to scale, which is often neglected in
the electricity literature and which is where the paper con-
tributes. In order to cover costs, the network operator is re-
quired to increase transmission charges. A welfare maxi-
mizing network operator will do this in a deadweight loss
minimizing way, i.e. using Ramsey prices (Ramsey 1927).
Transmission tariffs are set inversely proportional to the de-
mand and supply elasticities at the different nodes, meaning
that the network operator will not only charge the users of a
particular transmission line, but all users in the network.
Note that a truly welfare maximizing pricing mechanism
would imply using a two-part tariff. However, we assume
that the network operator does not do this, despite the fact
that in many countries, it is common practice to charge a
transmission fee with a fixed and a variable component. We
have two motivations for this choice. First, the linear tar-
iff assumption can be interpreted as the case where a two-
part tariff is being used of which the fixed charge is insuffi-
cient to fully recover fixed transmission costs. In that case,
the remainder of the costs needs to be covered by the us-
age charge. Second, in most cases the ‘fixed’ part is not
completely fixed. It depends on actual network usage and
therefore still creates a deadweight loss.3 In the absence of
distortion-free instruments, it then remains optimal to use a
form of Ramsey prices.
Our paper is most in line with, who also study cost re-
covery. They look at three models where costs are allocated
proportional to different measures of network usage. They
present simulation results for the Spanish market. Contrary
to our paper, they assume that generation firms are perfectly
competitive and that consumers do not react to the additional
transmission charges used to cover costs. Advantages and
disadvantages of the different methods are highlighted but
no global welfare standard is used to compare different sce-
narios.
2.3 Congestion and Market Power
In energy markets, generators often have (local) market
power, for instance in a so called load pocket.4 In situa-
2This output includes the transport of electricity, but also other func-
tions, such as the provision of reliable electricity supply (operation of
reserve power and balancing markets) and of qualitative power (e.g.
voltage level, frequency stability).
3The fixed part often depends on the maximal usage of the network
over a certain time period, or the average use of the network over a
time period. As the fixed part is a function of the actual use of the
network, users will take it into account when they make their decision
about how much transmission they want to use. They will transport less
electricity than the welfare optimum, and deadweight loss is created.
4A load pocket is an area where there is insufficient transmission ca-
pability to reliably supply 100% of the electric load without relying
tions where firms have local market power, the network op-
erator might find it optimal to subsidize production as this
might create additional benefits in the market, for instance
by reducing congestion. Note that, as a consequence, the
network operator will have to increase transmission chargers
for other network users in order to balance his budget. Thus,
subsidizing production is not necessarily welfare improving
as it comes at a cost. This also happens in practice. A net-
work operator, realizing that some firms have market power,
will often sign ‘must run’ contracts with those firms, offer-
ing them long term contract at a preferential rate of return
on their extra production.
The contribution of our paper is to allow for such types
of (local) market power and to derive optimal transmission
prices in that case. The results are similar in spirit to those
found by Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980). They study
the optimal taxation of externalities when there is market
power in the output market. Typically the Pigouvian taxes,
which are supposed to correct the externality, will be lower
than under perfect competition due to the additional market
failure (market power). Our paper is different as our regula-
tor faces a budget constraint.
2.4 Modeling Market Power
Before describing the model itself, we briefly review the rel-
evant literature of imperfect competition in generation. Two
approaches have been developed in the specialized litera-
ture to model imperfect competition in such a multi-good
market: the multi-unit auction and the supply function equi-
librium approach.5 One of the major drawbacks of both ap-
proaches is that the spatial structure of the electricity market,
and therefore the impact of transmission constraints, is of-
ten omitted. Both are quite difficult to apply in a market with
transmission constraints. One notable exception is the work
of Hobbs et al. (2000) who restrict themselves to linear sup-
ply functions. Most researchers therefore opt for some kind
of Cournot market, while dropping some of the multi-good
aspects of the actual market.6
on generation capacity that is physically located within that area. It
is the result of high concentrations of intensive power use inevitable
in a big city and limitations, known as constraints, on the transmis-
sion system that limit the ability of load to be served by generat-
ing resources located remotely. This definition was taken from ‘http://
www.uspowergen.com/2008/02/27/what-is-a-load-pocket/.
5See for instance the models of von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) for
the multi-unit action approach. The supply function equilibrium con-
cept is based on Klemperer and Meyer (1989). Holmberg et al. (2008)
show that a multi-unit discrete supply function equilibrium might con-
verge to the continuous supply function concept.
6This choice is supported by an empirical study of Wolak and Patrick
(2001) who suggest that Cournot competition is an appropriate rep-
resentation of the electricity generation market. Willems et al. (2009)
compare supply function equilibria and Cournot models and show that
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In this paper generators behave à la Cournot in the energy
market but are price takers in the transmission market. This
is inspired by the models of Smeers and Wei (1997) and Wei
and Smeers (1999). Both papers consider Cournot behavior
in generation, but Smeers and Wei (1997) assume that gen-
erators perceive transmission prices as being set on the basis
of congestion pricing, whereas Wei and Smeers (1999) as-
sume regulated pricing as the basis for transmission pricing.
The current model differs from Wei and Smeers (1999) in
that the transmission charges are set by the network operator
rather than by a regulatory rule. We assume that the welfare
maximizing transmission firm also takes into account mar-
ket imperfections in electricity generation when setting its
transmission prices.
The electricity market is modeled as a Stackelberg game.
Mathematically, this gives rise to an Mathematical Program
with Equilibrium Constraints (Luo et al. 1996). Such mod-
els are becoming more and more common in the simula-
tion of the electricity markets, but often the timing of the
game is reversed: generators bid in stage 1 and the net-
work operator balances the network in stage 2. See for
instance (Ehrenmann 2004; Gabriel and Leuthold 2010;
Hobbs et al. 2000 and Neuhoff et al. 2005)
In order to solve the numerical optimization problem, we
relax the complementarity conditions of the second stage
and use several starting values to be confident that we are
close to the global optimum. For a comparison of different
methods to solve MPEC problems see Fletcher and Leyffer
(2002).
2.5 Long term efficiency
In our paper we do not study the long term incentives for
investments in generation capacity. We restrict ourselves to
short run efficiency. Cossent et al. (2009) and Joskow and
Tirole (2005) discus some of the challenges we face regard-
ing the long term integration of renewable energy into the
network. We need a regulatory scheme that gives both long
and short term incentives to investors to invest in new gener-
ation capacity as well as to the network operators to upgrade
networks. The coordination of investments in generation and
transmission assets is still an unsolved problem.
Nevertheless, we hope that the qualitative results of our
paper will hold also in the long run, if the short term de-
mand and supply elasticities are replaced with their long
term equivalents. This remains for further study. Dijk et al.
(2009) look at the impact of network pricing on the dy-
namic efficiency of investments in the electricity sector in a
there are not significant differences between both models when one
looks at the available market data. Other studies using Cournot com-
petition are Borenstein et al. (1999, 2000), Borenstein and Bushnell
(1999), Cardell et al. (1997), Hogan (1997), Oren (1997) and Stoft
(1997).
stochastic two stage oligopolistic model. It is shown that so-
cial and private incentives are not aligned and that additional
regulatory instruments are required. Their model takes con-
gestion into account, but cost recovery is neglected.
3 The Model
Define the sets F and G as the sets of generation firms and
generation plants. Let Gf be the set of generation plants
owned by generation firm f ∈ F . With I being the set of net-
work nodes, Gi denotes the generation plants at node i ∈ I ,
and Gf i the generation plants at node i owned by firm f .
Furthermore, let A be the set of transmission lines in the
network.
For notational simplicity, the model will be further de-
scribed as if it concerned a one period model, i.e. a model
that does not distinguish between peak and off-peak periods.
However, the numerical simulations in Sect. 5 differentiate
between peak and off-peak demand in a 4-period model.
The model distinguishes three types of players: con-
sumers, generation firms and the network operator.
Consumers are price takers. At node i, they consume
si units of electricity. Their inverse demand for electricity,
denoted as pi(si), is downward sloping and concave. Con-
sumer prices include compensation for both the generation
and the transmission of electricity.
Generation firm f ∈ F maximizes profits, while acting
as a price taker in transmission. At node i, it owns the gen-
eration plants g ∈ Gf i .
Electricity generation in plant g is qg and the generation
cost is Cg(qg). Total generation costs are convex, with fixed
generation costs suppressed to zero. The generation capacity
of plant g is labeled q¯g . Output should be nonnegative and
cannot exceed available generation capacity. Therefore, we
have 0 ≤ qg ≤ q¯g .
The network operator or transmission company maxi-
mizes social welfare and sets a nodal transmission charge
τ ci for consumers and τ
p
i for generators.
7 This is the per unit
amount generators and consumers have to pay for injecting
and taking power from the grid, respectively. Note that these
charges can be different. For instance, a generator who gen-
erates electricity in node i and sells electricity in node j will
payτpi + τ cj . However, the optimal transmission charges are
not uniquely defined.
First, take a node i at which no consumers are connected.
For that node, the consumer transmission price τ ci does not
7Within the set of linear price structures, this is the most general as-
sumption. It encompasses a number of ‘price structure’ options as spe-
cial cases. For example, only charging consumption, only charging
generation, a separate but uniform tariff for generation and consump-
tion and one uniform tariff for both generation and consumption as the
most extreme case.
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play a role and it can safely be set equal to zero. The same is
true for nodes without generation. Here, τpi is not uniquely
defined and the charge is set equal to zero.
Second, we can without loss of generality set one of
the charges equal to zero because it is only the sum of
the consumer and generation transmission charge, and not
its composition that is important. The network operator has
therefore one degree of freedom in setting the transmission
charge components. This can easily be checked by noting
that one can uniformly increase all generation tariffs with t
and decrease all consumer tariffs with t without changing
the sum of the charges. We can therefore arbitrarily fix one
transmission price in one node equal to zero. This is done
for the consumption charge in the swing node, i.e. τ ci = 0
with i = swing node.
Finally, note that the model implicitly assumes that the
charges need to be paid for all consumption and genera-
tion, even if generation and consumption are located at the
same node. A generator in node i who sells electricity lo-
cally does not use the transmission network, but will have
to pay a transmission payment τii = τ ci + τpi . We will call
this charge the price wedge in node i as it creates a wedge
between the consumer’s price and the generator’s price.
The model has two stages. In the first stage, the transmis-
sion operator sets transmission prices. In the second stage,
generation firms play a Cournot game in which transmis-
sion prices and their competitor’s quantities are assumed as
given. The next subsection describes the second stage of the
game.
3.1 The Second Stage
Each firm f observes the transmission charges τpi and τ
c
i
as set by the network operator and plays a Cournot game.
A firm f collects revenue by selling sf i units of electricity
at node i at the per unit price pi . Firms also set the produc-
tion level qg(g ∈ Gf ) at each of their plants. Their competi-
tor’s sales in node i, denoted by s˜−f i , are taken as given.
Apart from generation costs, firms also pay a transmission
cost τpi for injecting electricity to the network at node i, and
τ ci for the delivery of electricity to node i. This results in the









[Cg(qg) + τpi qg].
(1)
The nodal price pi that is received by generator f depends
on the total sales in that node, i.e.
pi = pi(si),
si = sf i + s˜−f i
where the tilde indicates that the variable is considered as
given. In (1), the first term reflects revenues from electricity
sales net of transmission charges paid at the consumption
nodes. The second term reflects generation costs and trans-
mission charges to put the electricity on the network. Sum-
marizing, we have the following maximization problem for
a generator:8
Max










[Cg(qg) + τpi qg]









si = sf i + s˜−f i ∀i ∈ I.
(2)
As noted before, the first constraints reflect generation ca-
pacity constraints. The second constraint represents the en-
ergy balance at the firm level, i.e. total output should equal
total sales. The last constraint represents demand. This con-
straint has no multiplier as it is substituted into the objec-
tive function and the other constraints before derivatives are
taken.
The following first order conditions are then derived:
∂Cg(qg)
∂qg
+ τpi + μg − μ¯g = λ
p
f ∀g ∈ Gf i, ∀i ∈ I, (3)
pi + ∂pi(si)
∂si
sf i − τ ci = λpf ∀i ∈ I. (4)
These are the standard first-order conditions for profit maxi-
mization, i.e. as long as generation constraints are not bind-
ing, marginal revenue equals marginal cost in all market seg-
ments. The Lagrange multiplier of the energy balance con-
straint λpf , is the value of energy in the network for genera-
tion firm f . This value is different for every firm.
Cost minimization requires that each firm equalizes
the sum of the marginal cost and the generation charge
at all generation plants. Profit maximization requires that
marginal revenues net of consumption charges are equal-
ized.
Note that each firm’s reaction function with respect to the
sales s−f i and the transmission charges, τ ci and τ
p
i can be
derived from (2), (3) and (4).
The multipliers μ
g






· qg = 0,
μ¯g ≥ 0, μ¯g · (qg − qg) = 0.
(5)
8Note that in this formulation nodal sales of the generators can become
negative. Generators can act like arbitrageurs that buy electricity in one
region and sell it in another. They will, however, still take into account
the effect on the marginal revenue in both regions. Therefore, with a
limited number of firms, not all price differences will be arbitraged
away. As the number of generation firms increases, arbitrage will im-
prove.
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3.1.1 Electricity Transmission
The model captures the technical features of the electricity
system, especially at the level of electricity transport. Elec-
tricity transport is subject to physical constraints. These con-
straints have an impact on the power flow through the net-
work and therefore potentially also on the pricing of trans-
mission services. In this paper we concentrate on active
power and we adopt a simplified DC flow model without
losses.9
Each line a ∈ A in the network is characterized by a
transmission capacity Qa . Denoting the flow over the line a
as Qa , we must have
Qa ≤ Q¯a ∀a ∈ A. (6)
Transmission must not be larger than the available transmis-
sion capacity.
The flow over a line a depends on the injection and the
extraction of electrical energy in all the nodes of the net-




θa,i(qi − si) = Qa (7)









qg ∀i ∈ I. (9)
The flow over a transmission line is a linear function of the
net injections at all nodes. The variables θa,i are the power
transmission distribution factors (PTDFs). The factors θa,i
describe how much a transaction from node i to the swing
bus will change the flow on line a. For example, a transac-
tion of size F from node i to node j can be decomposed as
a transaction from node i to the swing node and a (negative)
transaction from the swing node to nodej . The impact of
this on line a then equals F × (θa,i − θa,j ). The PTDFs are
determined by the physical properties of all the lines and the
layout of the network.
Equations (6)–(9) describe the transmission possibilities
of the network, i.e. they define the production feasibility set
of the network operator.
9Such a model assumes that line resistance is small relative to reac-
tance, that voltage magnitudes are the same at all nodes, and that volt-
age angles between nodes at opposite ends of a transmission line are
small. Engineers often use the linearised model of the network for long
term planning. See Schweppe et al. (1988).
The alternative, AC-power flow, was used in a previous version of
the program, but did not give fundamentally different results.
3.1.2 Security of Supply
The network operator also needs to secure the supply of
electricity. A minimal requirement for this is that, if unex-
pectedly a line goes out of service the remaining lines should
still be able to transport all supplied electricity. This is the
“n − 1” rule. The network operator will check that for all
contingencies k ∈ K the network is still capable of accom-
modating all flows.
For instance, if during contingency k the line α ∈ A
breaks down, then the set of the remaining lines A\{a}
should be able to transport the power over the network. Af-
ter a contingency, the flows redistribute themselves over the
network, and these new flows should still be feasible given
the thermal constraints of the remaining lines.
Taking into account the security of supply for all contin-




θka,i(qi − si) ≤ Q¯a ∀a ∈ A, ∀k ∈ K. (10)
For notational simplicity, we will assume that the set of con-
tingencies K also includes the case where all lines are avail-
able, such that we can drop equations (6) and (7). Equa-
tions (8)–(10) describe the feasible set for transmissions on
the security constrained network.
3.2 The First Stage
The network operator maximizes welfare subject to a budget
constraint. He sets the consumption and generation trans-
mission charges (τ ci and τpi ), which can be differentiated
over the nodes. It is assumed that the cost of providing trans-
mission services is separable into operating costs and capac-
ity costs. In the present model, operating costs and network
losses are neglected. Therefore, only the capacity costs B
remain.10




(τ ci si + τpi qi) − B. (11)
The first term between brackets is the revenue of selling
transmission services to consumers at node i. The second
term is the revenue of selling transmission to the genera-
tors at node i. The last term represents capacity costs. By
assumption, capacity costs are fixed.










10It was noted before that B can also be interpreted as being the frac-
tion of the transmission firms costs that needs to be collected via usage
charges, i.e. net of the revenues collected via the standing charge of a
two-part tariff.
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Fig. 1 The Belgian high
voltage network, situation
in 2002






qg ∀f ∈ F (13)
the Cournot behavior (Sales-Production),
pi(si) + ∂pi(si)
∂si
sf i − τ ci = λpf ∀i ∈ I, ∀f ∈ F, (14)
∂Cg(qg)
∂qg
+ τpi + μg − μ¯g = λ
p
f





· qg = 0, qg ≥ 0,













qg ∀i ∈ I, (19)
and the budget constraint:
∑
i∈I
(τ ci si + τpi qi) − B = tr ≥ 0. (20)
4 Data and Calibration
Before continuing with the simulations, we discuss the data
that were used as an input for the model. Also, the calibra-
tion procedure will be described. The choice of the technical
features of the transmission grid and of the available gener-
ation plants is inspired by the Belgian electricity system.
4.1 The Network
Figure 1 shows the network that has been modeled. It con-
sists of 55 nodes and 92 lines and includes all the Belgian
380 kV and 220 kV transmission lines, but also some 380 kV
lines in The Netherlands and France because they are impor-
tant for the flows inside the Belgian network. The full lines
on the graph are 380 kV lines, the dotted lines are 220 kV
lines. The line between Gouy and Avelgem represents sev-
eral lines of the 110 kV network that connect both nodes.11
We impose the n − 1 rule for all Belgian 380 kV lines,
except for some loose ends. Imposing the n−1 rule for these
latter lines makes no sense when we do not include lines
11Network data was kindly provided by Peter Van Roy and Konrad
Purchala of the K.U.Leuven Electrical Engineering Department. More
detailed information on origin and destination, voltage level, admit-
tance, thermal capacity. . . is available upon request.
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Fig. 2 Histogram of electricity
demand in Belgium in 2002
(Source Elia)
at lower voltage levels that can accommodate the flows in
case of a failure of the 380 kV line. Also, the n − 1 rule
is not imposed for the interconnections with France and The
Netherlands and for the lines within these countries, because
sufficient or adequate information is lacking.
4.2 Electricity Generation
The total generation capacity connected to the grid is
14475 MW. Of this capacity, approximately 1070 MW con-
sists of smaller generation plants which are not included
in the model. These are mainly combined heat and power
generation units (970 MW), and some small hydro units
(90 MW). We assume that in any time period, 50% of these
plants produce electricity. The remaining production capac-
ity (13405 MW), is spread over 51 generation units, which
are modeled in the paper based upon data of the year 2002.12
Each generator is assumed to have constant marginal pro-
duction costs Cg .
In the simulations, we assume three Cournot players,
having a market share in generation capacity of 43%, 34%
and 23%, respectively.13
12Some of the data was kindly provided by Leonardo Meeus and Kris
Voorspools of the Departments of Electrical and Mechanical Engineer-
ing, respectively. Data was also taken from several editions of the BFE
statistical yearbook and the annual report of Electrabel. Data are avail-
able from the authors upon request.
13One firm received all nuclear power plants, while the remaining
power plants were allocated to two competitors of more or less equal
size. Both these firms received a mix of generation technologies. Joint
ownership of generation plants was excluded and only one generation
firm is allowed per generation node.
Each player maximizes profit, taking into account plant
characteristics. Generation decisions are described by the
first order conditions (3) and the complementarity condi-
tions (5). The player’s complementarity conditions are non-
linear, which makes the optimization problem non convex.
Three plants are pumped storage plants, i.e. they can
store energy in the form of a water reservoir. When gen-
eration costs are low, these plants consume electricity and
pump water to a higher level. When generation costs are
high, the reservoir is emptied and electricity is produced.
The underlying decision process is not modeled in this pa-
per. We assume that these plants generate electricity during
peak periods at a marginal cost of €13 per MWh, and we
count them as part of the consumption side during the off-
peak periods.14
4.3 Electricity Demand
The model has been calibrated on the basis of Belgian data
for electricity demand in 2002.15 In that year the average
demand was 9.52 GW. Total yearly demand in Belgium is
83.4 TWh per Year. Figure 2 presents a histogram of demand
in Belgium. The histogram is based on periodical observa-
tions with a length of 15 minutes. The highest and lowest
observed demand levels were 13.7 GW and 5.8 GW, respec-
tively.
14A better modeling of the pumped storage plants would require taking
into account the capacity constraint of the water reservoir, and to make
the generation and consumption decisions endogenous.
15The network of one part of Luxembourg forms an integral part of the
Belgian network. Demand levels for that part are included in the model
here.
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Obviously, the demand for electricity is not constant over
time and in order to take this into account, the numerical
one-period model has been extended to a 4-period model.
Currently, the model does not take full account of the poten-
tial links that could exist between these four periods. Taking
these links into account would certainly enrich the model
and this is seen as a priority for further research.
At least four of such potential links can be identified.
First, cross-substitution can take place between time peri-
ods. For example, demand for electricity during the night
will not only depend on the price in the night, but also on
the price that is charged during the day. In this model it is
assumed that these cross-substitution effects are zero. There
is thus no intertemporal substitution.
Second, consumption and generation decision for the
pumped storage plants create a link between periods and can
be endogenized.
Third, intertemporal production constraints exist for gen-
eration, because generators can increase or decrease output
only at a certain speed (ramping constraints). Starting up and
shutting down generators is costly and requires time. Finally,
the transmission firm is maximizing welfare and is subject
to a budget constraint. This constraint creates an intertem-
poral link as the marginal welfare cost of obtaining revenue
should now be equal over time periods.16 In this paper, only
this last effect is taken into account.
4.4 Network Operator
The network operator has total costs of B = €649M per
year (Source: Annual report ELIA, 2002). Capital costs are
about 50% of the total costs, the other 50% being operating
costs, such as wages and network maintenance costs. Wages
and network maintenance costs are not directly related to the
amount of MW transported over a line, they are inherent to
the existence of that line. Therefore, as we could not find a
more detailed description of the cost function of the network
operator, we assume all costs to be fixed. Network losses are
neglected in the model. Clearly, these would depend on the
actual use of the network. With a total electricity demand of
83.4 TWh in 2002, the average cost of the network operator
is €7.78 per MWh.
4.5 Calibration
The calibration of the model involves three steps. Each of
these three steps is described below.
16Note that there would be no (binding) budget constraint if the net-
work operator would be a profit maximizer.
4.5.1 Fixing Periodic Aggregate Demand and the Length of
Each Period
The first step is to decide about the level of electricity de-
mand in each of the four periods and about the length of
each period in a standard year. This has been done on the
basis of the data presented in Fig. 2. This figure shows how
often a certain demand level occurs in the Belgian market.
We will consider 4 periods with average demand levels fixed
at 8, 10, 11.5 and 12.5 GW. The length of each time period is
then set such that the cumulative distribution function of the
4 periods approximates the observed cumulative distribution
function (Table 1). As 500 MW of this demand is provided
by small generators, the demand level as seen by the genera-
tors in our model is fixed 500 MW lower. Thus, the demand
levels used to calibrate the demand functions are 7.5, 9.5, 11
and 12 GW.
4.5.2 Fixing a Reference Price for Each Period
Given the periodic electricity demand derived in the first
step, we minimize the production costs to supply this de-
mand. Here, it is assumed that pumped water storage can
only be used in periods one and two. In periods three and
four, pumped storage plants pump water into a reservoir.
Via this procedure, we obtain the marginal production
cost for each period. The obtained values are increased with
the average costs of the network operator (€7.78 per MWh)
to obtain a reference price for each period (Table 1).
4.5.3 Fixing Periodic Electricity Demand in the
Consumption Nodes
In the third step, we derive for each node a linear demand
function. The price elasticity of demand is assumed to be
−0.2 in all nodes and all periods.17 Total demand is dis-
tributed proportionally over the different nodes on the basis
of the demand data in Van Roy (2001) and the reference
prices are calculated in step 2. This information is sufficient
to derive for each consumption node the parameters of the
linear demand function.
17The own price elasticity is based on estimates found in the litera-
ture. Lijesen (2007) provides a survey of studies that estimate short
term price elasticities. These estimates range from −0.071 to −1.113.
Koichiro (2010) estimates the price response in the Californian energy
market. He compares electricity demand of consumers in the same
neighborhoods facing different type of prices because they belonged
to different utilities. He obtains marginal price elasticities of −0.18
to −0.20 during the California electricity crisis in 2000, and in the
range −0.135 to −0.211 for the full time period (1999 to 2006).
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Table 1 Calibration of the 4







(€ per MWh)(hr) (%)
1 12.5 208 2.4% 12.0 45.2
2 11.5 1759 20.1% 11.0 37.9
3 10.0 3410 38.9% 9.5 35.6
4 8.0 3383 38.6% 7.5 27.0
Average 9.6 8760 100.0% 9.1 33.0















The model also takes into account that the Belgian grid is
used for relatively large transit flows. These flows are gen-
erally directed from France to The Netherlands and, as a
first approximation, we assume an exogenous transit flow
of 1000 MW from the south to the north. This transit is as-
sumed to occur in all periods. The foreign generation and
load nodes are summarized in Table 2.
5 Simulation Results
This section discusses the results of three simulation runs.
Section 5.1 discusses the first best case, with perfect compe-
tition in generation and no budget constraint for the network
operator. The following subsections subsequently drop one
of these assumptions: Sect. 5.2 adds a budget constraint for
the network operator, Sect. 5.3 adds imperfect competition
in generation.
5.1 First Best
In the first best the network operator does not face a bud-
get constraint and generators are competing competitively,
but the transmission capacity is limited. Table 3 shows the
simulation results for a representative hour in each period.
It gives total welfare, the surpluses for the economic agents,
the network operator costs, the generation level and the mul-
tiplier of the budget constraint (which in this case is zero
by definition). Period 1 represents peak demand, periods 2
and 3 have intermediate demand, and period 4 has off-peak
demand. The column “Average” gives the values for an av-
erage hour over the course of the year, taking into account
the length of each period.
Table 4 shows aggregate values for all time periods and
for the full year. Consumption in the low and the high de-
mand period are 7734 MW and 11657 MW, respectively.
Total annual production is 79791 GWh.18
In Table 4, the indicated prices are wholesale prices, cov-
ering generation as well as transmission. If all transmission
charges would be set equal to zero, then in all periods the
network capacity would be insufficient to satisfy the demand
for transmission. Thus, congestion is an issue in the four pe-
riods, and network use must be charged in order to solve
capacity problems. A welfare maximizing network opera-
tor will set charges such that distortions are minimized. The
best way to do this is to tax the effective use of the network,
but not the ‘intra-nodal’ trade, i.e. the network operator will
set the price wedge equal to zero, i.e. τii = 0 (τ ci = −τpi ).
The reason for this is simple: setting a positive price wedge
τii = τ ci + τpi > 0, increases the distortion in the local mar-
ket at node i, but only has an indirect effect on the network
flows that cause the congestion. Note that this only makes
sense for nodes at which both generators and consumers are
connected. If not, the price wedge does not play a role.
These congestion charges allow the network operator to
collect a revenue equal to €13 300 per hour in the low de-
18This is lower than the 83.4 TWh that was used to calibrate the de-
mand functions. The reason for this is that we neglected the network
constraints when we were calibrating. The network constraints reduce
demand for electricity.
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Table 3 First best, results for a representative hour







38.6%Length of the period %
Welfare (k€ per hr) 908.6 1647.5 1256.3 1003.4 586.9
Consumer surplus (k€ per hr) 772.4 1301.8 1031.7 837.1 539.8
Producer surplus (k€ per hr) 170.8 305.2 230.6 194.1 107.9
Profit network operator (k€ per hr) −34.5 40.5 −5.9 −27.8 −60.8
Revenue network operator (k€ per hr) 39.5 114.6 68.2 46.3 13.3
Fixed cost network operator (k€ per hr) 74.1 74.1 74.1 74.1 74.1
Multiplier budget constraint (€ per €) – – – – –
Total generation (MWh per hr) 9108 11657 10880 9403 7734
Average price (€ per MWh) 32.2 48.0 37.9 35.5 22.4
Minimum price (€ per MWh) 18.5 26.1 23.2 17.6 15.4
Maximum price (€ per MWh) 76.4 121.7 91.7 92.6 46.8
Table 4 First best, aggregate results







3,383Length of the period hrs
Welfare (M€) 7959 342 2210 3422 1986
Consumer surplus (M€) 6766 270 1815 2855 1826
Producer surplus (M€) 1496 63 406 662 365
Profit network operator (M€) −303 8 −10 −95 −206
Revenue network operator (M€) 346 24 120 158 45
Fixed cost network operator (M€) 649 15 130 253 251
Multiplier budget constraint (€ per k€) – – – – –
Total generation (GWh) 79790 2420 19138 32067 26165
mand period and €114 600 per hour in the peak demand pe-
riod. Aggregated over the four periods, the network operator
would cover 53% of its fixed costs by charging these conges-
tion charges. Note that hourly congestion revenue is mainly
collected in the periods 1, 2 and 3. (See Table 6.) Congestion
is low in period 4, so congestion revenue is rather low in that
period.
The congestion charges are node specific. They depend
on how much consumption in a node affects the flows on the
congested lines. In fact, the network operator uses the stan-
dard nodal pricing model. As a consequence, consumers at
different nodes will pay different prices for electricity. In the
low demand period, prices range between €15 and €47 per
MWh. In the peak period, the price range is €26 to €122
per MWh.
Note that at first sight, one would expect that at times of
low demand, the network is more likely to be uncongested.
This is however not necessarily the case as in periods of low
demand only base-load plants are running and, therefore,
the ‘average distance’ between consumption and generation
nodes can increase compared to periods of peak demand. As
a result the network is used more.19 In the case of a contin-
gency, flows are rerouted to a greater extent, as there is often
no generation to provide the electricity locally.
5.2 Second Best
In the second best case, the network operator is faced with
a budget constraint. Congestion charges now need to be in-
creased above their first best level in order to obtain suffi-
cient revenue to cover the remaining 47% of the network
operator’s cost.
These transmission prices will result in increased whole-
sale prices and thus reduced demand in all periods. Ag-
gregate demand (and generation) decreases by 1.5% to
78,592 GWh. Prices are now in the range of €18 and €47
19Of course, this depends on the location of the base-load plants in the
network. If base-load plants are not distributed homogenously in the
network congestion is larger.
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Table 5 Second best, results for a representative hour







38.6%Length of the period %
Welfare (k€ per hr) 908.3 1647.1 1256.0 1003.0 586.7
Consumer surplus (k€ per hr) 749.0 1270.5 1001.4 811.6 522.7
Producer surplus (k€ per hr) 159.3 282.6 214.1 179.1 103.3
Profit network operator (k€ per hr) 0.0 94.0 40.5 12.4 −39.3
Revenue network operator (k€ per hr) 74.1 168.1 114.6 86.5 34.8
Fixed cost network operator (k€ per hr) 74.1 74.1 74.1 74.1 74.1
Multiplier budget constraint (€ per k€) 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3
Total generation (MWh per hr) 8971 11521 10722 9262 7612
Average price (€ per MWh) 34.8 50.8 40.7 38.3 24.7
Minimum price (€ per MWh) 21.7 29.7 27.0 21.0 17.9
Maximum price (€ per MWh) 76.8 122.8 93.0 92.6 46.8
Table 6 Second best, aggregate results







3,383Length of the period hrs
Welfare (M€) 7957 342 2209 3421 1985
Consumer surplus (M€) 6561 264 1761 2768 1768
Producer surplus (M€) 1395 59 377 611 349
Profit network operator (M€) 0 20 71 42 −133
Revenue network operator (M€) 649 35 202 295 118
Fixed cost network operator (M€) 649 15 130 253 251
Multiplier budget constraint (€per k€) 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3
Total generation (GWh) 78590 2392 18861 31585 25753
per MWh in off-peak hours and of €30 and €123 in peak
hours.
On average, the network operator needs to collect €74
100 per hour. Table 5 shows that the network operator col-
lects €168 100 per hour during the peak period, and €34
800 per hour during base load periods. He makes sure that
marginal deadweight loss of collecting revenue is equal in
all the four time periods. Collecting €1 000 of extra rev-
enue creates a deadweight loss of €17.3.
The network operator increases transmission tariffs, in
order to cover his costs. The solution to this problem is
known as Ramsey pricing. The basic idea is that prices
are increased in a way that minimizes distortions, which
amounts to applying price increases that are inversely pro-
portional to the demand elasticities.
The use of Ramsey prices has two effects. On the one
hand, the higher transmission prices will decrease the to-
tal demand for transmission. On the other hand, the pattern
of the flows over the network will change. In the first best,
transmission quantities depend on the price levels and the
marginal production costs. In the second best, transmission
quantities will also depend on the demand and supply elas-
ticities.
5.3 Strategic Behavior of Generators
The last simulation looks at how imperfect competition in-
fluences the second best model. Now, all three limitations
are present: transmission constraints, market power in gen-
eration and a budget constraint for the grid operator. Market
power in generation is modeled as Cournot competition. Ta-
ble 7 presents the results aggregated over the four periods.
The results do not come as a surprise. Ceteris paribus, less
competition reduces welfare.
The multiplier of the budget constraint measures the net
cost of giving one Euro to the network operator. The effect
is about twice as large with Cournot as with perfect com-
petition. There are two reasons for this. As total demand
drops by almost 30% from perfect competition (= the sec-
ond best) to the Cournot model, the network operator needs
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Table 7 Aggregate results of the 4 scenarios
Scenario First best Second best Cournot
Welfare (M€ per yr) 7959 7957 7310
Consumer surplus (M€ per yr) 6766 6561 3778
Producer surplus (M€ per yr) 1496 1395 3532
Profit network operator (M€ per yr) −303 0 0
Revenue network operator (M€ per yr) 346 649 649
Fixed cost network operator (M€ per yr) 649 649 649
Multiplier budget constraint (€ per k€) – 17.3 30.6
Total generation (GWh) 79,790 78,590 59,691
Average price (€ per MWh) 32.2 34.8 75.7
Minimum price (€ per MWh) 18.5 21.7 68.7
Maximum price (€ per MWh) 76.4 76.8 92.1
to increase the transmission tariffs with 30% in order to ob-
tain the same revenue. At the same time, transmission prices
create a larger deadweight loss, as there is already a dead-
weight loss due to the strategic behavior of the Cournot play-
ers.
The average price for electricity increases from €34.8
per MWh under perfect competition to €75.7 per MWh in
the Cournot setting.
In an oligopoly with 3 players, welfare is about 8% lower
than with perfect competition. Consumer surplus drops
by 42%, producers’ surplus more than doubles.
In the Cournot model, the location of the firms in the
grid might be important in determining the market power of
the generators. If firms have geographically dispersed pro-
duction capacities, the effect of congestion might be much
smaller than when firms are geographically concentrated.
Also the ownership structure of generation capacity
might affect the market outcome. If all firms own a diverse
portfolio with base load and peak load plants, then each firm
will have an incentive to withhold some production capac-
ity at the margin, as it will increase the price it receives for
the infra-marginal plants. In the opposite case where one
firm only owns base load plants and another firm only peak
load plants, there are fewer incentives to reduce production.
These effects of location and ownership remain a topic for
further research.
6 Conclusions
This paper looks at the socially optimal transmission prices
in a congested network with imperfect competition in elec-
tricity generation and a network operator facing a binding
budget constraint. It shows that generators and consumers
have to pay different transmission prices at the social op-
timum. These differences reflect the fact that the network
operator needs to collect revenues and that the generation
sector is not competitive.
The model in this paper allows imperfect competition
in generation, but assumes that generators are price tak-
ers in the transmission market. The network operator is a
Stackelberg leader who sets transmission price before gen-
erators decide about generation and sales. The model is il-
lustrated with three simulation runs: a first best scenario
(limited transmission capacity), a second best scenario (a
binding budget constraint), and a second best scenario with
Cournot competition in generation. The parameterization of
the model is inspired by the technical characteristics of the
Belgian electricity system. It includes the Belgian high volt-
age transmission grid and the lines in France and the Nether-
lands which are important for the Belgian network. The
network is presented as a linearized DC-load flow model.
Transmission is limited by the thermal constraints of the
lines and n − 1 security constraints are imposed.
The model provides a framework that can help policy
makers to design transmission tariffs. It shows how prices
should be set in response to changes in market power. The
model links some of the standard regulation literature on
Ramsey pricing with the electricity literature on optimal
pricing of transmission networks. The qualitative results that
come out of the model can be very informative, but some
reservation is at place if one would consider implementing
such a pricing scheme. There are a number of reasons for
this.
We assume that generators are price takers in the trans-
mission market, while, in practice, generators might abuse
their locational market power. Other types of models are
needed if such market behavior exists. (See for example
Borenstein et al. (2000).)
The model neglects entry in generation, and only derives
short run optimal prices. These prices might not give the
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right long run incentives for investing in new generation ca-
pacity.
The network operator is assumed to have perfect infor-
mation about generation costs and demand. In practice, this
information is not readily available. Any mechanism to al-
locate transmission capacity will have to take into account
this information asymmetry.
The network operator might not be maximizing welfare,
but rather profits or the interests of some political pressure
groups. This is the reason why the network operator is reg-
ulated and is limited in setting transmission prices. A com-
panion paper studies the strategic behavior of the network
operator (Pepermans and Willems 2006).
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